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KEY FINDINGS
1. Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) within the climate system have the potential to accelerate 
human-induced climate change and even shift the Earth’s climate system, in part or in whole, into 
new states that are very different from those experienced in the recent past (for example, ones with 
greatly diminished ice sheets or different large-scale patterns of atmosphere or ocean circulation). 
Some feedbacks and potential state shifts can be modeled and quantified; others can be modeled or 
identified but not quantified; and some are probably still unknown. (Very high confidence in the poten-
tial for state shifts and in the incompleteness of knowledge about feedbacks and potential state shifts).
2. The physical and socioeconomic impacts of compound extreme events (such as simultaneous heat 
and drought, wildfires associated with hot and dry conditions, or flooding associated with high pre-
cipitation on top of snow or waterlogged ground) can be greater than the sum of the parts (very high 
confidence). Few analyses consider the spatial or temporal correlation between extreme events.
3. While climate models incorporate important climate processes that can be well quantified, they do 
not include all of the processes that can contribute to feedbacks, compound extreme events, and 
abrupt and/or irreversible changes. For this reason, future changes outside the range projected by 
climate models cannot be ruled out (very high confidence). Moreover, the systematic tendency of cli-
mate models to underestimate temperature change during warm paleoclimates suggests that climate 
models are more likely to underestimate than to overestimate the amount of long-term future change 
(medium confidence).
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15.1 Introduction
The Earth system is made up of many compo-
nents that interact in complex ways across a 
broad range of temporal and spatial scales. As 
a result of these interactions the behavior of 
the system cannot be predicted by looking at 
individual components in isolation. Negative 
feedbacks, or self-stabilizing cycles, within 
and between components of the Earth system 
can dampen changes (Ch. 2: Physical Drivers 
of Climate Change). However, their stabi-
lizing effects render such feedbacks of less 
concern from a risk perspective than positive 
feedbacks, or self-reinforcing cycles. Positive 
feedbacks magnify both natural and anthro-
pogenic changes. Some Earth system compo-
nents, such as arctic sea ice and the polar ice 
sheets, may exhibit thresholds beyond which 
these self-reinforcing cycles can drive the 
component, or the entire system, into a radi-
cally different state. Although the probabilities 
of these state shifts may be difficult to assess, 
their consequences could be high, potentially 
exceeding anything anticipated by climate 
model projections for the coming century.
Humanity’s effect on the Earth system, 
through the large-scale combustion of fossil 
fuels and widespread deforestation and the 
resulting release of carbon dioxide (CO2) into 
the atmosphere, as well as through emissions 
of other greenhouse gases and radiatively 
active substances from human activities, is 
unprecedented (Ch. 2: Physical Drivers of 
Climate Change). These forcings are driving 
changes in temperature and other climate 
variables. Previous chapters have covered a 
variety of observed and projected changes in 
such variables, including averages and ex-
tremes of temperature, precipitation, sea level, 
and storm events (see Chapters 1, 4–13).
While the distribution of climate model 
projections provides insight into the range of 
possible future changes, this range is limited 
by the fact that models do not include or fully 
represent all of the known processes and com-
ponents of the Earth system (e.g., ice sheets or 
arctic carbon reservoirs),1 nor do they include 
all of the interactions between these compo-
nents that contribute to the self-stabilizing and 
self-reinforcing cycles mentioned above (e.g., 
the dynamics of the interactions between ice 
sheets, the ocean, and the atmosphere). They 
also do not include currently unknown pro-
cesses that may become increasingly relevant 
under increasingly large climate forcings. This 
limitation is emphasized by the systematic 
tendency of climate models to underestimate 
temperature change during warm paleocli-
mates (Section 15.5). Therefore, there is sig-
nificant potential for humanity’s effect on the 
planet to result in unanticipated surprises and 
a broad consensus that the further and faster 
the Earth system is pushed towards warming, 
the greater the risk of such surprises.
Scientists have been surprised by the Earth 
system many times in the past. The discovery 
of the ozone hole is a clear example. Pri-
or to groundbreaking work by Molina and 
Rowland2, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were 
viewed as chemically inert; the chemistry by 
which they catalyzed stratospheric ozone de-
pletion was unknown. Within eleven years of 
Molina and Rowland’s work, British Antarctic 
Survey scientists reported ground observa-
tions showing that spring ozone concentra-
tions in the Antarctic, driven by chlorine from 
human-emitted CFCs, had fallen by about 
one-third since the late 1960s.3 The problem 
quickly moved from being an “unknown 
unknown” to a “known known,” and by 1987, 
the Montreal Protocol was adopted to phase 
out these ozone-depleting substances.
Another surprise has come from arctic sea 
ice. While the potential for powerful positive 
ice-albedo feedbacks has been understood 
since the late 19th century, climate models 
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have struggled to capture the magnitude of 
these feedbacks and to include all the relevant 
dynamics that affect sea ice extent. As of 2007, 
the observed decline in arctic sea ice from 
the start of the satellite era in 1979 outpaced 
the declines projected by almost all the mod-
els used by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s Fourth Assessment Report 
(AR4),4 and it was not until AR4 that the IPCC 
first raised the prospect of an ice-free summer 
Arctic during this century.5 More recent stud-
ies are more consistent with observations and 
have moved the date of an ice-free summer 
Arctic up to approximately mid-century (see 
Ch. 11: Arctic Changes).6 But continued rapid 
declines—2016 featured the lowest annually 
averaged arctic sea ice extent on record, and 
the 2017 winter maximum was also the lowest 
on record—suggest that climate models may 
still be underestimating or missing relevant 
feedback processes. These processes could 
include, for example, effects of melt ponds, 
changes in storminess and ocean wave im-
pacts, and warming of near surface waters.7, 8, 9
This chapter focuses primarily on two types 
of potential surprises. The first arises from 
potential changes in correlations between 
extreme events that may not be surprising 
on their own but together can increase the 
likelihood of compound extremes, in which 
multiple events occur simultaneously or in 
rapid sequence. Increasingly frequent com-
pound extremes—either of multiple types of 
events (such as paired extremes of droughts 
and intense rainfall) or over greater spatial or 
temporal scales (such as a drought occurring 
in multiple major agricultural regions around 
the world or lasting for multiple decades)—
are often not captured by analyses that focus 
solely on one type of extreme. 
The second type of surprise arises from self-re-
inforcing cycles, which can give rise to “tip-
ping elements”—subcomponents of the Earth 
system that can be stable in multiple different 
states and can be “tipped” between these 
states by small changes in forcing, amplified 
by positive feedbacks. Examples of potential 
tipping elements include ice sheets, modes 
of atmosphere–ocean circulation like the El 
Niño–Southern Oscillation, patterns of ocean 
circulation like the Atlantic meridional over-
turning circulation, and large-scale ecosystems 
like the Amazon rainforest.10, 11 While com-
pound extremes and tipping elements con-
stitute at least partially “known unknowns,” 
the paleoclimate record also suggests the 
possibility of “unknown unknowns.” These 
possibilities arise in part from the tendency of 
current climate models to underestimate past 
responses to forcing, for reasons that may or 
may not be explained by current hypotheses 
(e.g., hypotheses related to positive feedbacks 
that are unrepresented or poorly represented 
in existing models). 
15.2 Risk Quantification and Its Limits
Quantifying the risk of low-probability, 
high-impact events, based on models or obser-
vations, usually involves examining the tails 
of a probability distribution function (PDF). 
Robust detection, attribution, and projection 
of such events into the future is challenged by 
multiple factors, including an observational 
record that often does not represent the full 
range of physical possibilities in the climate 
system, as well as the limitations of the sta-
tistical tools, scientific understanding, and 
models used to describe these processes.12
The 2013 Boulder, Colorado, floods and the 
Dust Bowl of the 1930s in the central United 
States are two examples of extreme events 
whose magnitude and/or extent are unprece-
dented in the observational record. Statistical 
approaches such as Extreme Value Theory can 
be used to model and estimate the magnitude 
of rare events that may not have occurred in 
the observational record, such as the “1,000-
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year flood event” (i.e., a flood event with a 
0.1% chance of occurrence in any given year) 
(e.g., Smith 198713). While useful for many 
applications, these are not physical models: 
they are statistical models that are typically 
based on the assumption that observed pat-
terns of natural variability (that is, the sample 
from which the models derive their statistics) 
are both valid and stationary beyond the 
observational period. Extremely rare events 
can also be assessed based upon paleoclimate 
records and physical modeling. In the paleo-
climatic record, numerous abrupt changes 
have occurred since the last deglaciation, 
many larger than those recorded in the instru-
mental record. For example, tree ring records 
of drought in the western United States show 
abrupt, long-lasting megadroughts that were 
similar to but more intense and longer-lasting 
than the 1930s Dust Bowl.14 
Since models are based on physics rather than 
observational data, they are not inherently 
constrained to any given time period or set 
of physical conditions. They have been used 
to study the Earth in the distant past and 
even the climate of other planets (e.g., Lunt 
et al. 2012;15 Navarro et al. 201416). Looking 
to the future, thousands of years’ worth of 
simulations can be generated and explored 
to characterize small-probability, high-risk 
extreme events, as well as correlated extremes 
(see Section 15.3). However, the likelihood 
that such model events represent real risks is 
limited by well-known uncertainties in climate 
modeling related to parameterizations, model 
resolution, and limits to scientific understand-
ing (Ch. 4: Projections). For example, conven-
tional convective parameterizations in global 
climate models systematically underestimate 
extreme precipitation.17 In addition, models of-
ten do not accurately capture or even include 
the processes, such as permafrost feedbacks, 
by which abrupt, non-reversible change may 
occur (see Section 15.4). An analysis focusing 
on physical climate predictions over the last 
20 years found a tendency for scientific assess-
ments such as those of the IPCC to under-pre-
dict rather than over-predict changes that 
were subsequently observed.18 
15.3 Compound Extremes
An important aspect of surprise is the po-
tential for compound extreme events. These 
can be events that occur at the same time or 
in sequence (such as consecutive floods in 
the same region) and in the same geographic 
location or at multiple locations within a given 
country or around the world (such as the 2009 
Australian floods and wildfires). They may 
consist of multiple extreme events or of events 
that by themselves may not be extreme but to-
gether produce a multi-event occurrence (such 
as a heat wave accompanied by drought19). It 
is possible for the net impact of these events 
to be less than the sum of the individual 
events if their effects cancel each other out. 
For example, increasing CO2 concentrations 
and acceleration of the hydrological cycle may 
mitigate the future impact of extremes in gross 
primary productivity that currently impact the 
carbon cycle.20 However, from a risk perspec-
tive, the primary concern relates to compound 
extremes with additive or even multiplicative 
effects.
Some areas are susceptible to multiple types of 
extreme events that can occur simultaneously. 
For example, certain regions are susceptible to 
both flooding from coastal storms and riverine 
flooding from snow melt, and a compound 
event would be the occurrence of both simul-
taneously. Compound events can also result 
from shared forcing factors, including natural 
cycles like the El Niño–Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO); large-scale circulation patterns, such 
as the ridge observed during the 2011–2017 
California drought (e.g., Swain et al. 201621; 
see also Ch. 8: Droughts, Floods, and Wild-
fires); or relatively greater regional sensitivity 
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to global change, as may occur in “hot spots” 
such as the western United States.22 Finally, 
compound events can result from mutually 
reinforcing cycles between individual events, 
such as the relationship between drought and 
heat, linked through soil moisture and evapo-
ration, in water-limited areas.23 
In a changing climate, the probability of 
compound events can be altered if there is an 
underlying trend in conditions such as mean 
temperature, precipitation, or sea level that 
alters the baseline conditions or vulnerability 
of a region. It can also be altered if there is a 
change in the frequency or intensity of indi-
vidual extreme events relative to the changing 
mean (for example, stronger storm surges, 
more frequent heat waves, or heavier precipi-
tation events). 
The occurrence of warm/dry and warm/
wet conditions is discussed extensively in the 
literature; at the global scale, these conditions 
have increased since the 1950s,24 and analysis 
of NOAA’s billion-dollar disasters illustrates 
the correlation between temperature and 
precipitation extremes during the costliest 
climate and weather events since 1980 (Fig-
ure 15.1, right). In the future, hot summers 
will become more frequent, and although it 
is not always clear for every region whether 
drought frequency will change, droughts in 
already dry regions, such as the southwestern 
United States, are likely to be more intense 
in a warmer world due to faster evaporation 
and associated surface drying.25, 26, 27 For other 
regions, however, the picture is not as clear. 
Recent examples of heat/drought events (in 
the southern Great Plains in 2011 or in Califor-
nia, 2012–2016) have highlighted the inade-
quacy of traditional univariate risk assessment 
methods.28 Yet a bivariate analysis for the con-
tiguous United States of precipitation deficits 
and positive temperature anomalies finds no 
significant trend in the last 30 years.29
Another compound event frequently dis-
cussed in the literature is the increase in wild-
fire risk resulting from the combined effects of 
high precipitation variability (wet seasons fol-
lowed by dry), elevated temperature, and low 
humidity. If followed by heavy rain, wildfires 
can in turn increase the risk of landslides and 
erosion. They can also radically increase emis-
sions of greenhouse gases, as demonstrated by 
the amount of carbon dioxide produced by the 
Fort McMurray fires of May 2016—more than 
10% of Canada’s annual emissions.
A third example of a compound event in-
volves flooding arising from wet conditions 
due to precipitation or to snowmelt, which 
could be exacerbated by warm temperatures. 
These wet conditions lead to high ground-
water levels, saturated soils, and/or elevated 
river flows, which can increase the risk of 
flooding associated with a given storm days or 
even months later.23
Compound events may surprise in two ways. 
The first is if known types of compound 
events recur, but are stronger, longer-lasting, 
and/or more widespread than those experi-
enced in the observational record or projected 
by model simulations for the future. One ex-
ample would be simultaneous drought events 
in different agricultural regions across the 
country, or even around the world, that chal-
lenge the ability of human systems to provide 
adequate affordable food. Regions that lack 
the ability to adapt would be most vulnerable 
to this risk (e.g., Fraser et al. 201330). Another 
example would be the concurrent and more 
severe heavy precipitation events that have 
occurred in the U.S. Midwest in recent years. 
After record insurance payouts following the 
events, in 2014 several insurance companies, 
led by Farmers Insurance, sued the city of 
Chicago and surrounding counties for fail-
ing to adequately prepare for the impacts of 
a changing climate. Although the suit was 
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dropped later that same year, their point was 
made: in some regions of the United States, 
the insurance industry is not able to cope with 
the increasing frequency and/or concurrence 
of certain types of extreme events.
The second way in which compound events 
could surprise would be the emergence of 
new types of compound events not observed 
in the historical record or predicted by mod-
el simulations, due to model limitations (in 
terms of both their spatial resolution as well as 
their ability to explicitly resolve the physical 
processes that would result in such compound 
events), an increase in the frequency of such 
events from human-induced climate change, 
or both. An example is Hurricane Sandy, 
where sea level rise, anomalously high ocean 
temperatures, and high tides combined to 
strengthen both the storm and the magnitude 
of the associated storm surge.31 At the same 
time, a blocking ridge over Greenland—a 
feature whose strength and frequency may 
be related to both Greenland surface melt 
and reduced summer sea ice in the Arctic (see 
also Ch. 11: Arctic Changes)32—redirected the 
storm inland to what was, coincidentally, an 
exceptionally high-exposure location. 
Figure 15.1: (left) Potential climatic tipping elements affecting the Americas (Figure source: adapted from Lenton et al. 
200810). (right) Wildfire and drought events from the NOAA Billion Dollar Weather Events list (1980–2016), and associ-
ated temperature and precipitation anomalies. Dot size scales with the magnitude of impact, as reflected by the cost of 
the event. These high-impact events occur preferentially under hot, dry conditions.
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15.4 Climatic Tipping Elements
Different parts of the Earth system exhibit 
critical thresholds, sometimes called “tipping 
points” (e.g., Lenton et al. 2008;10 Collins et al. 
2013;25 NRC 2013;33 Kopp et al. 201611). These 
parts, known as tipping elements, have the po-
tential to enter into self-amplifying cycles that 
commit them to shifting from their current 
state into a new state: for example, from one 
in which the summer Arctic Ocean is covered 
by ice, to one in which it is ice-free. In some 
potential tipping elements, these state shifts 
occur abruptly; in others, the commitment to a 
state shift may occur rapidly, but the state shift 
itself may take decades, centuries, or even 
millennia to play out. Often the forcing that 
commits a tipping element to a shift in state 
is unknown. Sometimes, it is even unclear 
whether a proposed tipping element actually 
exhibits tipping behavior. Through a com-
bination of physical modeling, paleoclimate 
observations, and expert elicitations, scientists 
have identified a number of possible tipping 
elements in atmosphere–ocean circulation, the 
cryosphere, the carbon cycle, and ecosystems 
(Figure 15.1, left; Table 15.1). 
Table 15.1: Potential tipping elements (adapted from Kopp et al. 201611).
Candidate Climatic 
Tipping Element State Shift Main Impact Pathways
Atmosphere–ocean 
circulation
 
Atlantic meridional 
overturning 
circulation
Major reduction in strength
Regional temperature and precipitation; global 
mean temperature; regional sea level
El Niño–Southern 
Oscillation
Increase in amplitude Regional temperature and precipitation
Equatorial 
atmospheric 
superrotation
Initiation Cloud cover; climate sensitivity
Regional North 
Atlantic Ocean 
convection
Major reduction in strength Regional temperature and precipitation
Cryosphere  
Antarctic Ice Sheet Major decrease in ice volume
Sea level; albedo; freshwater forcing on ocean 
circulation
Arctic sea ice
Major decrease in summertime 
and/or perennial area
Regional temperature and precipitation; albe-
do
Greenland Ice Sheet Major decrease in ice volume
Sea level; albedo; freshwater forcing on ocean 
circulation
Carbon cycle  
Methane hydrates Massive release of carbon Greenhouse gas emissions
Permafrost carbon Massive release of carbon Greenhouse gas emissions
Ecosystem  
Amazon rainforest Dieback, transition to grasslands Greenhouse gas emissions; biodiversity
Boreal forest Dieback, transition to grasslands Greenhouse gas emissions; albedo; biodiversity
Coral reefs Die-off Biodiversity
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One important tipping element is the Atlantic 
meridional overturning circulation (AMOC), a 
major component of global ocean circulation. 
Driven by the sinking of cold, dense water in 
the North Atlantic near Greenland, its strength 
is projected to decrease with warming due 
to freshwater input from increased precipita-
tion, glacial melt, and melt of the Greenland 
Ice Sheet (see also discussion in Ch. 11: Arctic 
Changes).34 A decrease in AMOC strength is 
probable and may already be culpable for the 
“warming hole” observed in the North Atlan-
tic,34, 35 although it is still unclear whether this 
decrease represents a forced change or inter-
nal variability.36 Given sufficient freshwater 
input, there is even the possibility of complete 
AMOC collapse. Most models do not predict 
such a collapse in the 21st century,33 although 
one study that used observations to bias-cor-
rect climate model simulations found that CO2 
concentrations of 700 ppm led to a AMOC 
collapse within 300 years.37 
A slowing or collapse of the AMOC would 
have several consequences for the United 
States. A decrease in AMOC strength would 
accelerate sea level rise off the northeastern 
United States,38 while a full collapse could 
result in as much as approximately 1.6 feet (0.5 
m) of regional sea level rise,39, 40 as well as a 
cooling of approximately 0°–4°F (0°–2°C) over 
the country.37, 41 These changes would occur in 
addition to preexisting global and regional sea 
level and temperature change. A slowdown 
of the AMOC would also lead to a reduction 
of ocean carbon dioxide uptake, and thus an 
acceleration of global-scale warming.42 
Another tipping element is the atmospher-
ic–oceanic circulation of the equatorial Pacific 
that, through a set of feedbacks, drives the state 
shifts of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation. This 
is an example of a tipping element that already 
shifts on a sub-decadal, interannual timescale, 
primarily in response to internal noise. Climate 
model experiments suggest that warming will 
reduce the threshold needed to trigger ex-
tremely strong El Niño and La Niña events.43, 
44 As evident from recent El Niño and La Niña 
events, such a shift would negatively impact 
many regions and sectors across the United 
States (for more on ENSO impacts, see Ch. 5: 
Circulation and Variability).
A third potential tipping element is arctic 
sea ice, which may exhibit abrupt state shifts 
into summer ice-free or year-round ice-free 
states.45, 46 As discussed above, climate models 
have historically underestimated the rate of 
arctic sea ice loss. This is likely due to in-
sufficient representation of critical positive 
feedbacks in models. Such feedbacks could 
include: greater high-latitude storminess and 
ocean wave penetration as sea ice declines; 
more northerly incursions of warm air and 
water; melting associated with increasing 
water vapor; loss of multiyear ice; and albedo 
decreases on the sea ice surface (e.g., Schröder 
et al. 2014;7 Asplin et al. 2012;8 Perovich et al. 
20089). At the same time, however, the point at 
which the threshold for an abrupt shift would 
be crossed also depends on the role of natural 
variability in a changing system; the relative 
importance of potential stabilizing negative 
feedbacks, such as more efficient heat trans-
fer from the ocean to the atmosphere in fall 
and winter as sea declines; and how sea ice in 
other seasons, as well as the climate system 
more generally, responds once the first “ice-
free” summer occurs (e.g., Ding et al. 201747). 
It is also possible that summer sea ice may not 
abruptly collapse, but instead respond in a 
manner proportional to the increase in tem-
perature.48, 49, 50, 51 Moreover, an abrupt decrease 
in winter sea ice may result simply as the 
gradual warming of Arctic Ocean causes it to 
cross a critical temperature for ice formation, 
rather than from self-reinforcing cycles.52
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Two possible tipping elements in the carbon 
cycle also lie in the Arctic. The first is buried 
in the permafrost, which contains an estimat-
ed 1,300–1,600 GtC (see also Ch. 11: Arctic 
Changes).53 As the Arctic warms, about 5–15% 
is estimated to be vulnerable to release in this 
century.53 Locally, the heat produced by the 
decomposition of organic carbon could serve 
as a positive feedback, accelerating carbon 
release.54 However, the release of permafrost 
carbon, as well as whether that carbon is 
initially released as CO2 or as the more potent 
greenhouse gas CH4, is limited by many fac-
tors, including the freeze–thaw cycle, the rate 
with which heat diffuses into the permafrost, 
the potential for organisms to cycle perma-
frost carbon into new biomass, and oxygen 
availability. Though the release of permafrost 
carbon would probably not be fast enough to 
trigger a runaway self-amplifying cycle lead-
ing to a permafrost-free Arctic,53 it still has the 
potential to significantly amplify both local 
and global warming, reduce the budget of 
human-caused CO2 emissions consistent with 
global temperature targets, and drive contin-
ued warming even if human-caused emissions 
stopped altogether.55, 56 
The second possible arctic carbon cycle tip-
ping element is the reservoir of methane hy-
drates frozen into the sediments of continental 
shelves of the Arctic Ocean (see also Ch. 11: 
Arctic Changes). There is an estimated 500 to 
3,000 GtC in methane hydrates,57, 58, 59 with a 
most recent estimate of 1,800 GtC (equivalent-
ly, 2,400 Gt CH4).60 If released as methane rath-
er than CO2, this would be equivalent to about 
82,000 Gt CO2 using a global warming poten-
tial of 34.61 While the existence of this reservoir 
has been known and discussed for several 
decades (e.g., Kvenvolden 198862), only re-
cently has it been hypothesized that warming 
bottom water temperatures may destabilize 
the hydrates over timescales shorter than mil-
lennia, leading to their release into the water 
column and eventually the atmosphere (e.g., 
Archer 2007;57 Kretschmer et al. 201563). Recent 
measurements of the release of methane from 
these sediments in summer find that, while 
methane hydrates on the continental shelf and 
upper slope are undergoing dissociation, the 
resulting emissions are not reaching the ocean 
surface in sufficient quantity to affect the at-
mospheric methane budget significantly, if at 
all.60, 64 Estimates of plausible hydrate releases 
to the atmosphere over the next century are 
only a fraction of present-day anthropogenic 
methane emissions.60, 63, 65 
These estimates of future emissions from 
permafrost and hydrates, however, neglect the 
possibility that humans may insert themselves 
into the physical feedback systems. With an 
estimated 53% of global fossil fuel reserves in 
the Arctic becoming increasingly accessible in 
a warmer world,66 the risks associated with 
this carbon being extracted and burned, fur-
ther exacerbating the influence of humans on 
global climate, are evident.67, 68 Of less concern 
but still relevant, arctic ocean waters them-
selves are a source of methane, which could 
increase as sea ice decreases.69
The Antarctic and Greenland Ice Sheets are 
clear tipping elements. The Greenland Ice 
Sheet exhibits multiple stable states as a result 
of feedbacks involving the elevation of the ice 
sheet, atmosphere-ocean-sea ice dynamics, 
and albedo.70, 71, 72, 73 At least one study suggests 
that warming of 2.9ºF (1.6°C) above a prein-
dustrial baseline could commit Greenland to 
an 85% reduction in ice volume and a 20 foot 
(6 m) contribution to global mean sea level 
over millennia.71 One 10,000-year modeling 
study74 suggests that following the higher 
RCP8.5 scenario (see Ch. 4: Projections) over 
the 21st century would lead to complete loss 
of the Greenland Ice Sheet over 6,000 years. 
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In Antarctica, the amount of ice that sits on 
bedrock below sea level is enough to raise 
global mean sea level by 75.5 feet (23 m).75 This 
ice is vulnerable to collapse over centuries to 
millennia due to a range of feedbacks involv-
ing ocean-ice sheet-bedrock interactions.74, 76, 77, 
78, 79, 80 Observational evidence suggests that ice 
dynamics already in progress have committed 
the planet to as much as 3.9 feet (1.2 m) worth 
of sea level rise from the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet alone, although that amount is projected 
to occur over the course of many centuries.81, 
82 Plausible physical modeling indicates that, 
under the higher RCP8.5 scenario, Antarctic 
ice could contribute 3.3 feet (1 m) or more to 
global mean sea level over the remainder of 
this century,83 with some authors arguing that 
rates of change could be even faster.84 Over 
10,000 years, one modeling study suggests 
that 3.6°F (2°C) of sustained warming could 
lead to about 70 feet (25 m) of global mean sea 
level rise from Antarctica alone.74
Finally, tipping elements also exist in large-
scale ecosystems. For example, boreal forests 
such as those in southern Alaska may expand 
northward in response to arctic warming. 
Because forests are darker than the tundra 
they replace, their expansion amplifies re-
gional warming, which in turn accelerates 
their expansion.85 As another example, coral 
reef ecosystems, such as those in Florida, are 
maintained by stabilizing ecological feedbacks 
among corals, coralline red algae, and grazing 
fish and invertebrates. However, these stabi-
lizing feedbacks can be undermined by warm-
ing, increased risk of bleaching events, spread 
of disease, and ocean acidification, leading to 
abrupt reef collapse.86 More generally, many 
ecosystems can undergo rapid regime shifts in 
response to a range of stressors, including cli-
mate change (e.g., Scheffer et al. 2001;87 Folke 
et al. 200488).
15.5 Paleoclimatic Hints of Additional 
Potential Surprises 
The paleoclimatic record provides evidence 
for additional state shifts whose driving 
mechanisms are as yet poorly understood. 
As mentioned, global climate models tend to 
underestimate both the magnitude of global 
mean warming in response to higher CO2 
levels as well as its amplification at high lat-
itudes, compared to reconstructions of tem-
perature and CO2 from the geological record. 
Three case studies—all periods well predating 
the first appearance of Homo sapiens around 
200,000 years ago89—illustrate the limitations 
of current scientific understanding in captur-
ing the full range of self-reinforcing cycles that 
operate within the Earth system, particularly 
over millennial time scales.
The first of these, the late Pliocene, occurred 
about 3.6 to 2.6 million years ago. Climate 
model simulations for this period systemati-
cally underestimate warming north of 30°N.90 
During the second of these, the middle Mio-
cene (about 17–14.5 million years ago), models 
also fail to simultaneously replicate global 
mean temperature—estimated from prox-
ies to be approximately 14° ± 4°F (8° ± 2°C) 
warmer than preindustrial—and the approx-
imately 40% reduction in the pole-to-equa-
tor temperature gradient relative to today.91 
Although about one-third of the global mean 
temperature increase during the Miocene can 
be attributed to changes in geography and 
vegetation, geological proxies indicate CO2 
concentrations of around 400 ppm,91, 92 similar 
to today. This suggests the possibility of as yet 
unmodeled feedbacks, perhaps related to a 
significant change in the vertical distribution 
of heat in the tropical ocean.93
The last of these case studies, the early Eocene, 
occurred about 56–48 million years ago. This 
period is characterized by the absence of per-
manent land ice, CO2 concentrations peaking 
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around 1,400 ± 470 ppm,94 and global tempera-
tures about 25°F ± 5°F (14°C ± 3°C) warmer 
than the preindustrial.95 Like the late Pliocene 
and the middle Miocene, this period also 
exhibits about half the pole-to-equator tem-
perature gradient of today.15, 96 About one-third 
of the temperature difference is attributable 
to changes in geography, vegetation, and ice 
sheet coverage.95 However, to reproduce both 
the elevated global mean temperature and the 
reduced pole-to-equator temperature gradient, 
climate models would require CO2 concentra-
tions that exceed those indicated by the proxy 
record by two to five times15—suggesting once 
again the presence of as yet poorly understood 
processes and feedbacks.
One possible explanation for this discrepancy 
is a planetary state shift that, above a particu-
lar CO2 threshold, leads to a significant in-
crease in the sensitivity of the climate to CO2. 
Paleo-data for the last 800,000 years suggest 
a gradual increase in climate sensitivity with 
global mean temperature over glacial-inter-
glacial cycles,97, 98 although these results are 
based on a time period with CO2 concentra-
tions lower than today. At higher CO2 levels, 
one modeling study95 suggests that an abrupt 
change in atmospheric circulation (the on-
set of equatorial atmospheric superrotation) 
between 1,120 and 2,240 ppm CO2 could lead 
to a reduction in cloudiness and an approxi-
mate doubling of climate sensitivity. However, 
the critical threshold for such a transition is 
poorly constrained. If it occurred in the past at 
a lower CO2 level, it might explain the Eocene 
discrepancy and potentially also the Miocene 
discrepancy: but in that case, it could also 
pose a plausible threat within the 21st century 
under the higher RCP8.5 scenario. 
Regardless of the particular mechanism, the 
systematic paleoclimatic model-data mis-
match for past warm climates suggests that 
climate models are omitting at least one, and 
probably more, processes crucial to future 
warming, especially in polar regions. For this 
reason, future changes outside the range pro-
jected by climate models cannot be ruled out, 
and climate models are more likely to under-
estimate than to overestimate the amount of 
long-term future change.
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TRACEABLE ACCOUNTS
Key Finding 1
Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) within the 
climate system have the potential to accelerate hu-
man-induced climate change and even shift the Earth’s 
climate system, in part or in whole, into new states that 
are very different from those experienced in the recent 
past (for example, ones with greatly diminished ice 
sheets or different large-scale patterns of atmosphere 
or ocean circulation). Some feedbacks and potential 
state shifts can be modeled and quantified; others can 
be modeled or identified but not quantified; and some 
are probably still unknown. (Very high confidence in the 
potential for state shifts and in the incompleteness of 
knowledge about feedbacks and potential state shifts).
Description of evidence base
This key finding is based on a large body of scientific 
literature recently summarized by Lenton et al.,10 NRC,33 
and Kopp et al.11 As NRC33 (page vii) states, “A study of 
Earth’s climate history suggests the inevitability of ‘tip-
ping points’—thresholds beyond which major and rap-
id changes occur when crossed—that lead to abrupt 
changes in the climate system” and (page xi), “Can all 
tipping points be foreseen? Probably not. Some will 
have no precursors, or may be triggered by naturally 
occurring variability in the climate system. Some will 
be difficult to detect, clearly visible only after they have 
been crossed and an abrupt change becomes inevita-
ble.” As IPCC AR5 WG1 Chapter 12, section 12.5.525 fur-
ther states, “A number of components or phenomena 
within the Earth system have been proposed as poten-
tially possessing critical thresholds (sometimes referred 
to as tipping points) beyond which abrupt or nonlinear 
transitions to a different state ensues.” Collins et al.25 
further summarizes critical thresholds that can be mod-
eled and others that can only be identified.
Major uncertainties 
The largest uncertainties are 1) whether proposed 
tipping elements actually undergo critical transitions; 
2) the magnitude and timing of forcing that will be 
required to initiate critical transitions in tipping ele-
ments; 3) the speed of the transition once it has been 
triggered; 4) the characteristics of the new state that re-
sults from such transition; and 5) the potential for new 
tipping elements to exist that are yet unknown.
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and 
agreement, including short description of nature 
of evidence and level of agreement
There is very high confidence in the likelihood of the ex-
istence of positive feedbacks, and the tipping elements 
statement is based on a large body of literature pub-
lished over the last 25 years that draws from basic phys-
ics, observations, paleoclimate data, and modeling. 
There is very high confidence that some feedbacks can be 
quantified, others are known but cannot be quantified, 
and others may yet exist that are currently unknown. 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates 
the above information
The key finding is based on NRC33 and IPCC AR5 WG1 
Chapter 12 section 12.5.5,25 which made a thorough as-
sessment of the relevant literature.
Key Finding 2
The physical and socioeconomic impacts of compound 
extreme events (such as simultaneous heat and drought, 
wildfires associated with hot and dry conditions, or flood-
ing associated with high precipitation on top of snow or 
waterlogged ground) can be greater than the sum of the 
parts (very high confidence). Few analyses consider the 
spatial or temporal correlation between extreme events.
Description of evidence base
This key finding is based on a large body of scientific 
literature summarized in the 2012 IPCC Special Report 
on Extremes.23 The report’s Summary for Policymakers 
(page 6) states, “exposure and vulnerability are key de-
terminants of disaster risk and of impacts when risk is re-
alized... extreme impacts on human, ecological, or phys-
ical systems can result from individual extreme weather 
or climate events. Extreme impacts can also result from 
non-extreme events where exposure and vulnerability 
are high or from a compounding of events or their im-
pacts. For example, drought, coupled with extreme heat 
and low humidity, can increase the risk of wildfire.”
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Major uncertainties
The largest uncertainties are in the temporal congru-
ence of the events and the compounding nature of 
their impacts.
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and 
agreement, including short description of nature 
of evidence and level of agreement 
There is very high confidence that the impacts of mul-
tiple events could exceed the sum of the impacts of 
events occurring individually. 
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates 
the above information 
The key finding is based on the 2012 IPCC SREX report, 
particularly section 3.1.3 on compound or multiple 
events, which presents a thorough assessment of the 
relevant literature.
Key Finding 3
While climate models incorporate important climate 
processes that can be well quantified, they do not in-
clude all of the processes that can contribute to feed-
backs, compound extreme events, and abrupt and/or 
irreversible changes. For this reason, future changes 
outside the range projected by climate models cannot 
be ruled out (very high confidence). Moreover, the sys-
tematic tendency of climate models to underestimate 
temperature change during warm paleoclimates sug-
gests that climate models are more likely to underes-
timate than to overestimate the amount of long-term 
future change (medium confidence).
Description of evidence base
This key finding is based on the conclusions of IPCC 
AR5 WG1,99 specifically Chapter 9;1 the state of the art 
of global models is briefly summarized in Chapter 4: 
Projections of this report. The second half of this key 
finding is based upon the tendency of global climate 
models to underestimate, relative to geological recon-
structions, the magnitude of both long-term global 
mean warming and the amplification of warming at 
high latitudes in past warm climates (e.g., Salzmann 
et al. 2013;90 Goldner et al. 2014;91 Caballeo and Huber 
2013;95 Lunt et al. 201215).
Major uncertainties
The largest uncertainties are structural: are the models 
including all the important components and relation-
ships necessary to model the feedbacks and if so, are 
these correctly represented in the models?
Assessment of confidence based on evidence and 
agreement, including short description of nature 
of evidence and level of agreement 
There is very high confidence that the models are incom-
plete representations of the real world; and there is me-
dium confidence that their tendency is to under- rather 
than over-estimate the amount of long-term future 
change.
Summary sentence or paragraph that integrates 
the above information
The key finding is based on the IPCC AR5 WG1 Chap-
ter 9,1 as well as systematic paleoclimatic model/data 
comparisons.
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